Models and Modeling

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MODELS AND MODELING What Semiotics Does, What Life Does [[(or do they?)|Contents]]

Outline: <center>[[Scientific Models]] [[Semiotic Models]] [[Modeling]] </center>

Why start with scientific models? Because the task of biosemiotics lies within the scientific study of meaningful phenomena in the biological world, and because an understanding of scientific models will tell us enough about modeling practices in the understanding of said phenomena. <center> [[What are scientific models?]] </center>

Semiotic models are fundamentally different from scientific models because of the technical treatment of the concept of model. "in semiotics models are based on a relation of similarity or isomorphism and are therefore associated to the iconic sign as understood by Peirce." (Ponzio 2010: 267) Lotman defines model as "an analogue of an object of perception that substitutes it in the process of perception" and a modeling system as "a structure of elements and rules of their combination, existing in a state of fixed analogy to the whole sphere of the object of perception, cognition, or organization" (J. Lotman 2011: 250) Is language a primary modeling system? And what are the main [[differences between semiotic and scientific modeling]]?

The problem of positing an object that may turn out not to exist gives us enough to see how isomorphism may turn out to be problematic even within semiotic models. Are [[signs]] of any value to understand models in both scientific and semiotic modeling?

In investigating the //objects// of our theories we make use of models and theories. Importantly, models and theories are not exactly the same! However, models may perform as theory for certain facts or phenomena. In characterizing theories, the most prominent views are Syntactic: a set of sentences in an axiomatized system of first order logic. Models are seen as descriptions. Semantic: an informal family of models. General structures But the [[ontology|Ontology of models]] of models is not unified and it depends on application and theoretical constitution.

Models in scientific research take many different forms: <ul> <li>Material models: Concrete representations</li> <li>Mathematical models: Formal, not covering all models</li> <li>Fictional models: Concrete, yet inexistent formulations</li> </ul> What is their [[functionality]]?

Models in science can <ul> <li>represent a way to deal with missing theory for certain facts</li> <li>a simplification of the already complex theory</li> <li>an interpretative bridge between theories</li> <li>the means to fulfill some missing part of our theories</li> <li>a method of confirmation of the previous theory according to new findings</li> <li>a method for explaining certain facts that appear in our theories</li> <li>a way to experiment on objects that are out of reach and obtain information about them</li> <li>a structural description of our theories; or as a bridge between theory and observation</li></ul> Reference: Apostel 1960: 125-127 [[Contents]]

Semiotic models are wider in scope than scientific models. As described, they are also of a purely epistemological nature. A model in the semiotic sense (or at least from the perspective of the Tartu school) is grounded in empirical notions. It’s interesting however to note that we cannot have all scientific models be based on empirical notions, as that would lead to a number of contradictions regarding some of the possible definitions for a scientific model, particularly those that use models themselves as theory. Are semiotic models capable of making scientific claims? Is there a [[middle ground]] between concepts?

Modeling in Tartu semiotics is less committed to specific concepts, which means we have a wide range of applicability for the notion of modeling systems. As objects in our models do not //need// to be material objects, we can posit existences that may turn out to be wrong. More importantly, semiotic modeling does not need to make assumptions about the ontological standing of models (though we can't say the same about modeling!), so we can rely on epistemological categorizations for our models. What about [[isomorphism]]?

Recall the following statement: "in semiotics models are based on a relation of similarity or isomorphism and are therefore associated to the iconic sign as understood by Peirce." (Ponzio 2010: 267) Do we need to be committed to isomorphism or iconicity for semiotic models? [[Contents]]

A sign relation in the Peircean sense can give us a way to label elements in a model, but that is not exactly interesting. However, all the sign talk introduces epistemological tools for developing potential semiotic models that //may// make interesting scientific claims. So what can we ultimately say about [[modeling in living systems]]?

Recall how models and modeling do not have the same character. The notion of //Umwelt// is particularly interesting to us here. The //Umwelt// as described by Uexküll is a theoretical model, but the act of interpreting signs in the world is modeling. That is certainly what characterizes semiotics: That models and modeling are both part and parcel of its research. //"to a certain extent, each sign (=sign process) is a modelling. It models, on the one hand, via the inclusion of an organism's experience, which is built into the organism's individual structure. On the other hand, the existence of the object in the sign makes the model correspond to the object [...]: all (semiotic) objects are fundamentally plural, as different from its complementary counterpart, the (physical) thing, which is single"// (Kull 2010: 48)